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The payment of bonuses can bring big benefits. But harm, too, can result.
In the financial sector, this is especially true, above all when they are
related to noisy indicators of performance over brief periods. This paper
starts by exploring these ideas, then proceeds to examine credit rating
agencies and their role in the 2007 credit crunch. It emphasizes the paucity
of long term high frequency financial data to quantify tail event risks, the
failure to apply analysis of fundamentals in financial and housing markets,
and rewards structures to individual players that reinforced myopia as
three key components of the crisis.
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Bonuses account for a large proportion of the pay bills of financial firms.  In UBS, for 
example, no less than 49% of pay in 2007 took the form of variable compensation or 
bonuses
5. The credit crunch that began in August 2007 has led to a hunt for culprits.  
Bonus payment systems and credit rating agency errors, singly or together, look like 
prime candidates at the point of writing this, one year later.  The main aim of this 
chapter is to explore and assess the thinking behind such allegations.  
 
 
BONUSES: SOME GENERAL ISSUES 
 
 
The payment of bonuses can do good.   This is especially true when performance-
related pay is compared with fixed remuneration.  Here are some of the main potential 
benefits: 
 
a.  a bonus typically provides greater incentive for effort on the part of the 
employee; 
b.  the employer may perceive that it reduces the marginal cost of employing 
labour, which will be especially welcome if rates of unemployment or 
marginal taxation are high; 
c.  in a partnership, payment of bonuses to staff below partner level may improve 
morale; 
                                                 
5 According to its published accounts: Financial Times (2008).    3
d.  compressing bonuses in bad times may be preferable, from all parties’ 
standpoints, to short time working or dismissals; 
e.  a bonus could promote greater loyalty among staff, and strengthen workers’ 
incentives to keep each other up to scratch.  
 
 
The first of these arguments stems directly from agency theory
6.  Suppose 
individuals’ levels of assiduity cannot be observed directly, but that more effort from 
any of them tends to improve some observable indicator of performance.  Fixed pay 
for a worker will elicit less effort than remuneration based positively, at least in part, 
on this measure of achievement.   Fixed pay creates the temptation to shirk, assuming 
(plausibly, surely) that employees prefer less effort to more.  And the case for bonuses 
becomes even stronger if the employee is less averse to risk.  
 
 
Benefit b rests on the idea that the employer will seek to maximize profits.   If the 
share of profits accruing to workers is fixed, maximizing the residue must imply 
maximizing total profits, too.  If the number of employees is determined by profit 
maximization, anything that cuts the marginal cost of hiring workers must strengthen 
the demand for labour.   And a shift from an unconditional fixed wage of x, to a part-
profit linked, part-fixed system of remuneration with a fixed value of less than x, and 
an average expected value of x, must mean that the employer will want to offer more 
jobs, or longer time at work.   In a simple case, at least, we can reason thus.  If 
unemployment levels are too high, or employment is discouraged by taxing wage 
payments at the margin, an efficiency gain would ensue.   In addition, there is at least 
a chance that both the firms’ owner(s) and the workers will gain as a result.   The key 




The argument for c looks more nebulous.  One way of putting it is that sharing 
bonuses beyond the top echelon of an institution is like an exchange of gifts: be nice 
                                                 
6 A good review of agency theory is provided by Prendergast (1999).  One of its key inventors was 
James Mirrlees, whose seminal work in the area is celebrated by Dixit and Besley (1997).    4
to the staff, and they will be nicer to you in return.   A more rigorous basis can be 
found when one thinks of informal contracts stretching beyond the present, into the 
future.  Your generosity to fellow players now may be rewarded by greater generosity 
towards you later on.  Cooperation is so often better than conflict, but cooperation 
often calls for the prospect of deferred rewards, that are not discounted too highly.  
Conflict can be all too tempting, and especially so for those with short sight.  The gift 
exchange idea was first expounded by Akerlof (1982).   That is a story of carrots.   A 
related stick version is the shirking-containment model of premium pay and 
unemployment, due to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  They argue that firms may pay 
workers more than they are worth, more than they might earn elsewhere, to make the 
dismissal (which might follow from detected shirking) all the more painful.    
 
 
The idea behind d is that the bonus acts as a shock absorber.  In good times, when the 
employer is busy and his products sell well, he pays the staff more.  In bad times, 
instead of releasing them, he keeps them on, but pays them less.   We are apt to think 
of big swings in aggregate employment as highly damaging, and hence anything that 
keeps jobs reasonably steady in the face of shocks has some definite merit in it.   A 
variant of the argument is that it is unfair for different age cohorts to have such a large 
– and possibly enduring – impact on their careers determined by the accident of when 
they were born, or leave education.  Those trying to get work in bad times may suffer 
a big loss of earnings, not just in the short term when jobs are hard to find, but later on 
too, because they have failed to gain from the experience that goes hand in hand with 
work.   
 
 
Benefit e stresses the possible advantages of a bonus scheme within the workforce.  It 
is especially powerful when bonuses are related to the observable production 
outcomes from a relatively small group.     Then the group is likelier to stop its 
members from slacking, because slacking by anyone is a public bad, from which all of 
them will suffer, despite its possible attraction to the individual concerned.   The 
bigger the group, the weaker this effect becomes.  From this standpoint, the ideal 
group size is just one, but the joint production implicit in teamwork may render this   5
infeasible.  By contrast, a fixed wage contract in a large company essentially divorces 
the individual’s return from her input completely.      
 
 
There are counterarguments, however.    One is that most workers are averse to risk.   
Bonuses make income uncertain.   Uncertain income streams are liable to imply 
uncertain consumption streams.  This is especially true when capital markets are 
imperfect.    If so, consumption smoothing in the face of income shocks is harder, and, 
in the limit, impossible.  The firm, on the other hand, may be in a far stronger position 
to absorb risk.  Moreover, if the employer is neutral to income risk when the 
employee dislikes it, it is best if the employer offers the worker full insurance.  This 
may well be true merely if the employer is less risk-averse than the worker.     
Problems arise, of course, because the provision of such insurance is liable to bring 
adverse incentive effects.    This is bound to happen if the worker likes extra leisure 
and acts privately, in ways unobservable (except perhaps at considerable cost) to any 
monitor the employer engages.   If the worker does not wish for any more leisure at 
the margin, on the other hand, or if his inputs can be observed ex post, that will not 
occur.   But the iron law of leisure says that you really value it highly when it is 
scarce; and random events and the actions of others make inferences about an 
individual staff member’s effort or quality of work hard to draw.        
 
 
Another counterargument is that whether a bonus system beats a system of fixed pay 
may well not be the acid test.   There are other possible arrangements.  One is a 
system of what one may call “fixed payoff”.  That would involve a set of all 
combinations of pay and work time, let us say, between which the employee felt 
indifferent.   Full time work remunerated at X might be thought of as equivalent, in 
utility terms, to “gardening leave” at an income of two thirds of X, for example; and 
both might deliver the same utility as a sixty hour week remunerated at 1.7X.   An 
employer faced by random shifts in the demand for labour, due to uncertainty about 
technology or the selling price of his product, could offer a contract that included all 
three of these options – and many more - as possibilities, with the employer, once the 
source of the uncertainty was revealed for a particular period, choosing the package   6
that would suit him best.   Very often, it transpires
7, this fixed payoff system will 
prove better than either of the other two alternatives.   
 
 
There are some further worries, too.   The bonus system is typically asymmetrical.  
These extra rewards, which are granted over and above the standard pay contract, 
usually have a minimum value of zero.  At the top end, there may be no limit.  So 
bonuses are essentially non-negative.  This asymmetry is tempered, however, by the 
possibility of subsequent contract non-renewal, or even dismissal.  And for some top 
management, there is the threat of possible early severance, with compensation levels 
that are sometimes negotiated ex post, and sometimes written into the contract ex 
ante.    These qualifications aside, the “heads I win, tails someone else loses” feature 
of a reward system with just carrots and no sticks creates an incentive to take risk, 
which may well be damaging in aggregate to the parties affected.   This is an 
especially serious concern for rewards in the financial sector.   It comes on top of 
limited liability provisions, and deposit insurance, which replicate the same one-
sidedness at the level of the firm.   The manager or employee concerned is in the 
position of enjoying an option.   He or she has opportunities for plenty of upside, 
while being shielded from sufficiently bad downside outcomes.  A risk neutral 
individual is encouraged to act as a risk lover.   Worse still, perhaps, projects with a 
negative skew, that spreads far out below the zero bound, will look particularly 
enticing.       
 
 
There is also a different concern, which arises if the individual potential bonus 
recipient is averse to risk.   Suppose the bonus is linked to the profits of the firm that 
employs him.   So he becomes a kind of equity holder in that firm, and quite possibly 
a formal one, too.   Why should he compound the risks by linking his wealth to the 
fortunes of his employer?   His job is on the line if the company fails; so would he not 
do better to diversify his portfolio by placing any wealth he has in the other assets?   
 
 
                                                 
7 Sinclair (1987) provides various examples of this.    7
BONUSES IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR  
 
 
Resolving the issue about what part bonuses should play in pay in the financial 
sector, and what form they should take, is now an urgent matter.  There is a 
widespread view that bonus concerns may well have contributed alarmingly to the 
gravity of the 2007-2008 financial crisis in a number of different ways.     
 
 
Paying bonuses based on sales commissions can be especially hazardous in insurance 
firms.   Income from policies written accrues now; but whether those policies turn out 
profitable will only be known later.  Many members of several Lloyds of London 
insurance syndicates were brought to bankruptcy in the 1990s by asbestos claims 
emanating from contracts with US clients written by the syndicates’ agents who were 
paid on commission at what turned out later to be excessively unfavourable premia.   
Had the agents been rewarded according to the subsequently revealed profitability of 
the business they wrote, and not to its immediately apparent volume, Lloyds would 
not have been brought to its knees.     Had the purveyors of sub-prime mortgages 
received bonuses based on the long-run net returns from the mortgages they sold, and 
not on the volume of mortgages they sold, the 2007 credit crunch might well have 
been much less serious.     Bonuses related to the wrong variable and defined over a 
short period are a recipe for serious trouble – especially when they apply to the 
financial sector.        
 
          
There are some interesting analytical issues here, too.   It seems likely that the 
truncation of bad-outcome returns implicit in the asymmetry of bonuses could have 
encouraged bank personnel to gamble excessively on the continuation of the house 
price boom in the US, the UK, Ireland, Spain and other countries where the post-2003 
bubble was especially apparent.     
 
 
Then there was the linking of remuneration to relative performance, measured over a 
short interval.  This must surely have made top staff wary of taking a longer term   8
view, and more inclined to join the “search for yield” that led to the carry trade 
borrowing in Japanese Yen and lending the proceeds to higher risk mortgagors.       
Nominal interest rates have been wafer thin in Yen for much of the period from the 
early 1990s, reflecting expectations of low (indeed often negative) rates of inflation, 
and very sluggish aggregate output in Japan.     
 
 
The principle of uncovered interest parity implies that the differential in short-term 
default-free rates between Japan in Yen, and the US in US dollars, should reflect 
expectations of the rate of change in the nominal exchange rate between these 
currencies over the specified interval.  Lower yen rates than dollar rates on three 
month treasury bills (an annualized 1% gap for example) should imply an expectation 
that the dollar will slide by about 25 basis points over the period.   Depreciating 
currencies should offer higher interest rates, to compensate for the expected decline in 
capital value.  The evidence is that uncovered interest parity (UIP) works far better in 
the long run (over a decade or so, for example) than the short run (over a few months, 
let us say)
8.    Part of the reason for the short term failure may be ascribed to the fact 
that short term interest rates tend to move in several little steps in the same direction – 
and more so, or for longer, than the market participants presumably predict.  This, 
coupled with the fact that an unexpected interest rate reduction (rise) in a country 
usually triggers a sudden jump downwards (upwards) in the external value of the 
currency, may generate the strange observation that we may see staggered 
appreciation coinciding temporarily with previous interest rate increases, against the 
grain of UIP.    
 
 
Other financial markets sometimes display similar phenomena.  Fundamentals 
ultimately tend to govern asset prices.  But these prices may drift away from the 
fundamentals for protracted periods, for many months, for example.  Sometimes they 
continue drifting away from them, in the wrong direction, for years on end.   Foreign 
exchange markets exhibit this tendency, with deviations from fundamental long term 
                                                 
8 See Mahadeva and Sinclair (2005), chapter 3, for multi-country econometric results confirming this, 
and Meredith’s chapter  in Mahadeva and Sinclair (2002) for some interesting discussion of the theory.     9
equilibrium showing half lives of three years or so
9.  Equity and real estate markets 
can also fall prey to these weird gravity-defying movements.   Such perverse 
movements are called bubbles.  Eventually bubbles burst.  Anomalies collapse.     
Reality re-establishes itself.  But large short run profits can often be made by betting 
against logic and following temporary trends.   The knowledge of this prompts people 
to think that it is safe to continue betting on such changes persisting for a while.  
Ultimately such bets end up with spectacular losses.   But not at once.  And if 
financial institutions remunerate traders with bonuses based on performance measured 
over brief intervals, that can only serve to inflate the bubbles further.    
 
 
When bonuses are linked to relative performance over these short periods, the picture 
can get even worse.   This is because traders are encouraged, if this is so, to copy each 
other very rapidly, and dissuaded from taking the contrarian long view that the market 
so badly needs for asset valuation to come into line with fundamentals.    Contrarians 
make great profits, and stabilize markets, but unfortunately they may well lose 
substantial amounts on a week to week or month to month basis.   Elongating the 
performance review period, from the standpoint of evaluating appropriate bonus 
payments, would therefore support the lonely ill-paid contrarians who rely on longer 
term thinking and penalize the antisocial copycats.     
 
 
Relative performance evaluation has other consequences.  One major plus is the fact 
that it can throw a sharper light on the subject’s achievements.  It strips away the 
effects of aggregate shocks that affect all players equally.  It focuses on the individual.   
It needs to be remembered, though, that there are shocks at the individual level too, so 
relative performance still gives a distorted signal in the short run.   There is also one 
big minus.   This is the fact that bonuses are not the only thing that relative evaluation 
may lead to.  There is also the possibility of non-renewal.   An exceptionally bad 
performance may well trigger that.  And if contract review occurs at a known date, 
and data accrue continuously in the meantime, someone who has clocked up a weak 
record in the interim is encouraged to take big bets.  If the bets go sour, dismissal 
                                                 
9 See Driver and Westaway in Driver, Sinclair and Thoenissen  (2005), for example.    10
ensues just the same.   But if they come off, the poor record is suddenly effaced.   The 
contract is renewed.   So the discontinuities in the structure of rewards inherent in the 
threat of impending non-renewal can cause the agent to do things the principal may 
well lose from.   This problem can arise when evaluation is absolute as well as 
relative, but may well become more acute in the latter case. 
 
 
Looking back on the errors made by staff at banks and other financial institutions in 
the past few years, we can see that it is not just a silly decision to disregard the 
eventually inexorable logic behind UIP that led to the carry trade errors.  Just as bad 
was the failure to apply the analysis of fundamentals to the housing market in the 
United States, and also to the mortgages that were supplied to back transactions in it.    
Theory tells us that real long run house prices in a country should move with its 
aggregate real income (positively, roughly one-for-one), real building costs (roughly 
half-for-one) and negatively with long run real interest rates.    
 
 
There is also a positive link between the level of the real price of housing and its 
anticipated rate of change. This feature of housing markets applies to all assets.  If 
gains are expected in the future, that can only enhance the attractiveness of an asset 
now.  A depreciating asset is unloved and necessarily cheap.   The level-rate of 
change link inevitably serves to make asset markets mercurial.  But at least when 
participants share reasonably good information, it really is a crucial piece of the 
jigsaw, pinning down price dynamics, and determining how asset prices evolve after 
an unexpected shock.  Short term movements in credit conditions and the like should 
really have next to no permanent impact on the prices or the stocks of housing.  If 
they propel house prices for a time away from these long run fundamentals, as they so 
often do, a sharp correction later on is almost bound to follow.  That is when the 
bubble bursts.    Bonuses to staff engaged in asset markets that are based on quarterly 
or annual performance will encourage myopia and breed bubbles.  When they reflect 
performance over a decent run of years, however, asset market participants will be 
rewarded for taking the longer view.  Those asset markets should function better, 
reacting sharply to news but otherwise displaying less excessive – and socially 
harmful – volatility.   Furthermore, Adrian and Shin (2007, 2008) provide compelling   11
evidence that the degree of leverage of financial firms changes over the cycle, 
increasing in booms when interest rates start low, and falling in downturns when 
interest rates start high.   This will interact with, and exacerbate, the cumulative 
effects of bubble movements and instabilities emanating from the housing and foreign 
exchange markets.    And this interaction, extended by the newly adopted practice of 
marking to market, may also serve to explain why a relatively limited set of initial 
losses (estimated by Greenlaw et al (2008) at some $400 billion) should, when 
combined with the consequences of jumps in oil and other commodity prices, should 
have fanned out into such a large fall, relative to trend, in world GDP.   Under 
perfectly functioning capital markets, a one off loss of $400 billion should be treated 
as a non-recurrent hit to wealth that might be expected to cut annual consumption by 
perhaps $20 billion, tapering eventually to nothing.  But the macroeconomic cost of 
the 2007 credit crunch, with its various knock on effects, appears thus far to be much, 
much larger than that.      
 
 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
 
Agency theory was developed to try to devise appropriate contracts between an 
individual who cannot do everything for herself, and a specialist hired to do it instead.  
Typically the specialist has much greater expertise.  But he may have his own agenda; 
he could well be averse to risk; and the quality of his work will often be bedevilled by 
extraneous factors that make his own contribution almost impossible to assess.  This 
is true of nannies and medics, and plumbers and lawyers.   It is also especially true of 
specialists working in finance, and in particular, those engaged in valuing individual 
assets.    
 
 
Banks collect the deposits of everyman, pool them, and lend most of the garnered 
funds out to borrowers they deem dependable.   Banks appraise potential borrowers, 
and the assets such loans would finance.   Asset evaluation is also a key aspect of the 
jobs, inter alios, of unit and investment trust managers, underwriters, stockbrokers, 
life insurers, fund managers, financial advisers, pension fund trustees and real estate   12
agents.  And when banks, private sector companies or state organizations seek to 
borrow by issuing debt, it is the role of rating agencies to tell the world how such 
debts should really be assessed.    Given that the loans generally prespecify much or 
all the stream of interest to be paid, the raters have to have a special focus on risk.   
How safe is this loan, the rating agencies ask themselves; and their answer to that 
question is essentially the rating that they publish.    
 
 
One side effect of the credit crunch that began in 2007 is the ungainly process of 
identifying possible culprits in which the media, the academics, the regulators and the 
politicians are now engaged.  High on this list come the credit rating agencies.   
Numerous questions began to arise about the agencies.  Here is a list of some of them.     
 
 
How could the raters get it all so wrong?     How could so many financial instruments 
to which they had given reasonably high or even, in many cases, top marks, end up in 
2007 and 2008 being unsaleable, and effectively worthless?     Were the credit rating 
agencies’ judgements on particular bonds coloured by the fact that they (or some 
other part of their companies) were earning large “advice” fees from those issuing, 
underwriting or holding them?   Did the key problems begin with the “structured” 
products (linked to U.S. mortgages, often to borrowers with weak credit histories) 
with their opaque character, and their split between origination and distribution?     
Were the rating agencies in fact adequately regulated?   Or sufficiently competitive?    
Was anyone really rating them? And had those making the 2004 revisions to the Basel 
arrangements for regulating minimum capital ratios for financial institutions been 
mistaken in giving the rating agencies much too large a role?   Have the agencies 
rated debt consistently – in particular, have private sector issuers been accorded 
unduly favourable ratings in comparison with public sector borrowers? 
 
 
To throw light on these questions, some descriptive details are called for. There are 
three large, long established credit rating agencies, all of which are based in the US, 
with tentacles stretching across the world.  These three giants together account for 
about five sixths of the world market in rating services.  They are Standard and Poors   13
(owned by McGraw Hill), Moody’s, and Fitch (owned by Fimalac).   The fourth 
largest, Dominion Bond Rating Service, began in 1976.  It operates from Toronto, 
Canada, but enjoys a global, though more modest, coverage.     
 
 
Two smaller Japanese raters, Japan Credit Rating Agency Ltd., and Ratings and 
Investment Information Inc., have  joined these four as members with formal US 
“Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization” status, together with four 
other US companies, the insurance rater A.M.Best, LACE Financial (based in 
Maryland), Egan-Jones (Philadelphia) and Realpoint LLC (Horsham, Pennsylvania).   
Realpoint was the last to be granted this status, in June 2008.  It is unique in 
generating its income from investor subscriptions, not fees charged to bond issuers
10.   
Outside the US, there are various other rating companies in Asia, including India’s 
ICRA, Indonesia’s PEFINDO, and Shanghai Brilliance in China, which has recently 
entered a technical service agreement with Standard and Poors.   
 
        
One feature that the main raters share is a debt-quality grading system in buckets.   
There are four key categories, prefaced by A (the best), B, C, and D (the worst).   The 
top three grades are subdivided: A embraces AAA, then AA, then plain A, and the B 
and C buckets similarly.  Moody’s suffixes its highest marks in each category with 
“aa”, then “a”.   The top grades are defined as the safest – those bonds likeliest to pay 
interest, and repay principal, in full on due dates.   Some of those subdivisions can be 
broken down further, with plus or minus suffixes.  
 
 
Buckets are crude objects.   Most of the various factors that contribute to the risks to 
the interest stream and the principal promised by a bond imply that those risks are in 
fact rather better treated as continuous, as opposed to discontinuous variables.  And 
although state preference theory is certainly richer and more focused than mean 
                                                 
10 Mainelli (2003) states that his private conversations with the big three raters revealed that none of 
them could have survived with a business model based on investor subscriptions.    This might in part 
be due to a free rider problem (groups of potential bond buyers might club together, with just one of 
them paying for the information).  But whatever its cause, reliance on bond issuer fees may create a 
serious conflict of interest for the rater that will perceive an undue return from flattery.     14
variance theory in abstract terms, and points to the benefits of a discrete approach in 
state space in simple one-horizon examples, the number of relevant possible states is 
effectively infinite.   Risk management models, such as Value at Risk, are certainly 
based on handling chance in a continuous fashion.    Besides this, a powerful 
objection to buckets is that they encourage a rater and a rated issuer to ask the 
question “How much rubbish can we get away with concealing behind better assets in 
this instrument and still qualify for a particular, respectable grade?”      With unique-
asset issues – and a fortiori for complex ones -  buckets encourage clustering at the 
bottom end of the range.      The smaller the number of buckets, or the more crowded 
the top bucket, the more acute this problem becomes.   And when, as we shall see 
actually occurred, almost all the securities related to sub-prime housing market loans 
ended up with the top rating, it was almost as if the effective number of buckets had 
shrunk to just one.   
 
 
So it would seem better, perhaps, to adopt a continuous scale.  This might range from 
zero to 100%.    If so, it could provide an answer to the following question.  If a risk 
neutral informed investor had to focus on just two events, payment repayment in full 
(A) and loss of principal and all interest (B), what would be the probability of event A 
that made her indifferent between that hypothetical bond and the actual bond under 
scrutiny?   If the answer was 0.9 (90%), let us say, the bond in question should ideally 
sell, on current information, at a 10% discount relative to an absolutely safe bond with 
similar maturity characteristics.    This would apply in the case of risk-neutral 
investors at least – or, more generally, to those who were able to diversify all risks.  
Refinements could be made to allow for various wrinkles, such as risk aversion and 
the ex ante covariances between the risky bond in question and other instruments, to 
capture the tastes and beliefs of the “representative” investor that dominates standard 
portfolio theory.    A further change that might be undertaken is the substitution of a 
range for a single number on the scale.  This would reflect a measure of the 
uncertainties attaching to the estimates of likely servicing flows and repayment of 
principal on the bond in question.   The range might be interpreted as a confidence 
interval, at 99% perhaps, despite the fact that this might suggest rather an implausible 
degree of precision for such very murky speculations.      
   15
 
An alternative to the continuous scale, with or without the confidence intervals, would 
be a simple ranking of rated objects.   We might call this the “Wrangler” list
11.   The 
agency would then attempt to judge the safety of a newly issued bond by comparing it 
with other instruments with broadly similar maturity, and placing it in order of 
perceived riskiness.  That order would be liable to change as new information came 
along.  And the ranking would contain other information, such as the issue size and 
date.    The Wrangler list would avoid the difficulties inherent in trying to quantify 
risks, and (because it was relative) guard against any tendency to unwarranted grade 
inflation.  In 2005, Moody’s data suggest that 80.8% of subprime mortgages were 
converted into pools rated AAA, and almost as many (80.1%) in 2006
12.   A more 
sober calculation would have been to grade all such derivatives with a B prefix or 
lower, but Greenlaw et al (2008) show that less than 5% got translated into those 
buckets in 2005 and 2006.   In hindsight this was a really grievous error.    So how 
could it be that almost all sub-prime mortgage backed securities ended up with the top 
grade for safety?    We shall return to this issue in a moment.       
 
 
All but one new, small rating agency, we saw, relies on fees charged to bond issuers 
rather than levied on investor subscriptions.   And the issuer fees have been amplified 
in recent years by fees for advice on how complex instruments can be structured so as 
to achieve a flattering grade. The conflict of interest issues raised here have been of 
considerable concern to observers for some while: Heffernan (2005), for example, 
talks at length about them, and the perils they posed.    
 
 
In its summary report on the three large credit rating agencies, The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (2008) recommends a number of changes to rules governing 
structured products and issuer-rater relations.  These include a ban on a firm rating 
one when relevant data that would permit others to check the grade are unavailable; a 
ban on a firm rating a product on which anyone in that firm has given advice; a 
                                                 
11 Wranglers are Cambridge Mathematics graduates, who, uniquely in the UK, are not classed (placed 
in buckets) but rather, ranked in order of merit.    
12 Source: Exhibit 3.3 in Greenlaw et al (2008), P. 17   16
requirement to publish all ratings and reratings; a ban on staff concerned with rating a 
product negotiating the issuer fee; and an insistence on a firm’s providing full 
explanations of the differences in its methods of assessing credit-worthiness and risks 
between traditional and structured products.    All these recommendations are prudent.  
Although the definition of “data”, “unavailable” and “methods” leave room for 
ambiguity in practice, and although there are already signs that the agencies will try 
hard to resist some of the changes proposed, these new rules should help to achieve 
something urgent and very important: the rebuilding of trust, not just in the agencies 
themselves, but also in the markets for financial instruments more generally, so many 
of which have ceased to function properly – if at all - since August 2007.        
 
 
The SEC proposals reflect analysis of the three firms scrutinized.   Residential 
mortgage backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the 
two key types of structured product the agencies were asked to rate, saw a torrent of 
new business in and after 2003, up to mid-2007.   Subprime mortgage originations 
had been just $97 billion in 1996; ten years later, they had ballooned to some $600 
billion
13. The number of CDO rated deals by two firms rose eightfold between 2002 
and 2006.  The character of the products also became increasingly opaque, as issuers 
attempted to reduce perceived risks, in the mysterious belief that “risk could be 
effectively eliminated by trading”, by ever-greater dicing and splicing of the original 
loans; and because the setting of fees and the determination of the rating sometimes 
involved overlapping staff, some issuers may have come to think that they could 
somehow pay their way towards more favourable ratings.    
 
 
Rating agency staff found it very hard to keep up; some rating criteria were not 
disclosed; resort was had to “out of model adjustments”, the reasons for which 
sometimes went unrecorded; internal audit arrangements in two of the three agencies 
appeared, the SEC judged, to be less than adequate.   In a wide sample, four fifths of 
the RMBS and CDO deals were found to have been underwritten by barely a dozen 
firms, raising concerns about paucity of competition among the “arrangers” who act 
                                                 
13 Ashcroft and Schuermann (2008).    17
as midwives for the bond issues and revenue source for the agencies.  Statistical 
models that agencies employed for evaluating bond risks (which depend on 
borrowers’ credit worthiness, default risks and losses in the event of default) varied 
widely across the agencies, and some appeared on technical grounds to be more 
trustworthy than others.    
 
 
Probably the gravest problem for the rating agencies, as well as for other participants 
in the housing and financial markets, was in fact the paucity of data they had from 
which to assess risks.  Imagine a farmer on the slopes of Mount Vesuvius in 78 AD, 
reporting that he had farmed there continuously for 20 years and never observed the 
slightest sign of an eruption.  “I look at the mountain every few minutes, and I can tell 
you with complete confidence that my thousands of observations suggest that there is 
absolutely nothing whatever to worry about”.   Statistical inference requires a large 
number of observations, it is true.  But it also calls for a long span of history from 
which these data are drawn.  This is because there can be low frequency disturbances, 
like the eruption of a volcano, which can also be large.   It is just no good assuming 
that the probability distribution from which random events are drawn is stationary and 
adequately represented by a large number of observations in a brief period of time.    
 
 
The explosion of computing power and of easily accessed high frequency data on, 
say, financial asset prices is a recent phenomenon.  It is a product of the last decade or 
two, no more.  Relationships seemingly firm and unshakable over this interval can 
break down without warning, and suddenly change.  It was changes like this in the 
correlograms and covariance matrices of bond prices that brought Long Term Capital 
Management to its knees in 1998.   The 2007 credit crunch saw history repeat itself
14.  
The US macroeconomic environment in the later 1990s and the early years of the 21
st 
century was exceptionally benign, with unemployment and inflation both low and 
steady, few business or bank failures, and a steady crescendo towards the end in house 
prices, accompanied by very low interest rates, that made mortgage lending 
collateralized on dwellings look – on a short term basis - a very safe and attractive 
                                                 
14 A recent paper by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) emphasize some of the similarities (and the 
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bet.   But had the data sets employed in the agencies’ models been able to incorporate 
comparably rich figures for the earlier years of great turbulence, like the 1970s or the 
decades between the wars, a very different picture of risks would have been obtained.   
And similar conclusions could have been reached, based on theoretical and empirical 
economic models of fundamentals in the housing and asset markets.  
 
 
The “Vesuvius problem” is really the key component of what we can now see was a 
perilously erroneous underpricing of risk in the three or four years before August 
2007.  Some errors were certainly made by the rating agencies.  Very low policy rates 
were set, and held down, by the Federal Reserve FOMC, from 2001 to 2005.  For 
much of that time, they were as much as 300 basis points below neutral, providing 
very strong support to private sector expenditures.  They were a key ingredient in 
generating the euphoria and explosion of borrowing.  But all major financial 
intermediaries must share some responsibility for the abnormal, wafer thin risk premia 
that persisted in wholesale money and corporate bond markets until mid 2007.  These 
generated misleading signals for the rating agencies and for final investors, lower 
down the chain.   And the standard risk management models
15 employed by all these 
institutions were narrowly backward looking.  They were based, like the Vesuvius 
farmer’s predictions, on the belief that all relevant financial markets would continue 
to be open and reasonably complete, and to function as they had in the happy, richly 
documented, golden decade or two up to 2007.   
 
 
What about bonuses?  Mortgage issuers often appear to have been paid on 
commission.  But importantly, the SEC reports no evidence that individual analysts’ 
bonuses or pay were linked to revenue from issuers whose bonds they had rated, or 
contrary to the agencies’ stated policies.   So this was not, it appears, a case of 
commissions distorting staff behaviour in the credit rating agencies themselves – 
however much this may have happened elsewhere in the chain of firms involved in 
the RMBS and CDO markets.  But bonuses will have reflected the firm’s profit over 
the year.  That is surely much too short a period for chickens to come home to roost.    
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Ideally one would want to reward raters and their analysts according to the accuracy 
of their rating judgements and revisions, as history unfolds over the longer term.  
Unfortunately this has not happened.   One of the SEC report’s most telling passages 
in this connection is a footnote on page 12, which quotes an email dated 15 December 
2006 from an analytical manager to a senior analytical manager in an unnamed rating 
agency about the CDO market.   “Let’s hope that we are all wealthy and dead by the 
time this house of cards falters”, the author wrote.   So as far as the credit rating 
agencies were concerned, the crisis that began in August 2007 certainly did not come 
as a complete surprise.   But the “house of cards” may well have tumbled much 
sooner than this author actually expected.     
 
 
In some ways we still know too little about the rating agencies performance, other 
than that their ratings imply that they (and others) read the housing, mortgage and 
credit markets badly wrong.   It is perhaps a little unfair to judge them too harshly. 
Shocks do happen, and no-one can foretell financial markets perfectly.    Where they 
were more at fault was in their blindness to economic fundamentals, which would 
have sounded alarm bells in the mortgage markets long before August 2007, and to 
which risk ratings should have responded.     It would be interesting to learn, too, 
whether all agencies are equally timely in the judgements they accord to instruments 
they rate in common, or whether one of them tends to lead the others in setting or 
adjusting grades.  There may have been unthinking copycatting.  Or even some 
cynical reasoning to the effect that an agency that gave stiffer grades would attract 
less business, given that all but one small one are funded by fees charged to the issuer.   
In the case of corporates with equity quotations, it would be valuable to learn whether 
rating revisions on their bonds tend to lead or lag big changes in corresponding equity 
prices.   We know of no detailed research on Granger tests of causation here; any 
serious attempt to determine the social benefit from credit rating agencies would rely 
greatly on the answers such tests threw up.    Competition among raters is clearly very 
important, and the SEC proposals will be helpful in that respect.    And there is a 
danger that raters, and other financial market players, will find themselves ensnared 
by unwise new regulations, established in the wake of the 2007 crisis, which could 
prove to stymie competition and innovation in the future.   But one point is clear: the 






Bonuses are not inherently bad.  When they are properly set and constructed, variable 
remuneration mechanisms can improve economic efficiency in numerous ways, when 
compared with many – if not all - alternatives.   This is true of financial as well as non-
financial firms.   But when the individual’s rewards have floors, and reflect short period 
outturns which are far more influenced by luck and the inputs of others than by what the 
individual has actually done, they can be perilous.  And when misapplied in the financial 
sector, where risk-taking at the shareholder’s, the taxpayer’s and the depositor’s expense can 
be especially pronounced, and the ripple of potential misery can spread out so far and to so 
many others, these dangers can be really alarming.    
 
 
The brevity of the observation period has other sinister effects.  It encourages over-reliance on 
a well documented recent past – what we have called the Vesuvius problem.  The generally 
benign financial environment that ruled in North America and much of Europe for the six or 
so years both before and after the turn of the century led to risk being gravely mispriced.  
Rating agencies fell victims to this; and so did banks and other financial intermediaries.     
When coupled with the short horizons of players in the financial markets, where most of the 
bonus systems in operation clearly made matters worse, attention was diverted from 
fundamentals and agents were encouraged to copy each other, and bet against the laws of 
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